CHANGJIN JOURNAL
CHANGJIN JOURNAL 10. 10. 04

Refugees in the snow, Korea,
1950
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The
Changjin Journal is designed to disseminate and solicit
information on the Chosin campaign. Comments and brief
essays are invited. Subject matter will be limited to
history of the Chosin campaign, as well as past or present
interpretation of that history.
See End Notes for distribution and other
notices. Colonel George A. Rasula, USA‐Ret., Chosin
Historian, Byron Sims, Contributing Editor
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CHANGJIN
JOURNAL 10.10.04
THIS ISSUE of the Changjin Journal is
based on Frozen Chosin from a point of view of participating
services. In doing so it will be critical of the handling of the
Chosin story in past history where omissions in historical fact can
misdirect the reader's point of view. In the pamphlet's
132 pages the reader will view about 150 photographs and 11 maps in
addition to other illustrations. We regret that many of the maps are
not sufficiently detailed nor related to nearby text. When possible
this journal will be presented as a filler to that already published
in the pamphlet. FROZEN CHOSIN
The newly published pamphlet by the Marine Corps titled
FROZEN CHOSIN: U.S. Marines at the Changjin Reservoir, by retired
Marine historian BGen Edwin H. Simmons, is excellent reading.
However, based on past historical writings, it does not tell the
whole story. As stated in the masthead, this publication is
"one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines in the Korean War era,
is published for the education and training of Marines...as part of
the DOD observance of the 50th anniversary of that war." We
thank General Simmons for including the Changjin Journal in his list
of sources, as well as recognition to a select few who offered
reviews of portions of the draft document in its early
stages. 
At Hyesanjin on the Yalu River, left to
right, BG Homer Keifer, 7th DivArty commander; BGen Henry Hodes, 7th
Div ADC; MGen "Ned" Almond, X Corps commander; MGen David
Barr, 7th Div commander; and Col Herbert Powell, commander of the
17th Infantry Regiment which made it to the Yalu River on 21
November. Powell is wearing the standard pullover (reversible) parka
shell, the same as worn by other 7th Division troops who went to the
Chosin Reservoir. Gen Hodes appears to be wearing a
button‐down version of a similar reversible parka shell.
Keifer on the left is wearing a standard officer's trench coat
while Gen Barr is wearing a hooded parka similar to that worn by the
Navy and Marines. We leave Gen Almond's garment up to the
viewer, a long jacket with fur lined hood. All seem to be wearing
shoepacs, although Almond could be wearing well shined combat boots.
COPING WITH THE COLD (p.2633)
Here we read eight pages devoted to the problem of cold during the
Chosin campaign. Of interest is the old school that believed socks
and insoles could be dried by placing them next to the body,
originating from the school of old soldiers who had no experience in
winter warfare. There had been a tendency to "fight the
cold" rather than understand what one must do to care for
himself and his equipment. The belief by some that temperatures
ranged from 35 to 40 degrees below zero is well handled by the
author by informing the reader that thermometers essential for
accurate firing by artillery recorded 20 to 25 below, as noted in
the personal memoir of General Smith. Dealing
with the cold at Chosin is a subject that warrants more attention.
The problem that existed then was caused by the circumstances of
that day in time. Soldiers did not have "winter parkas, shorter
and less clumsy than the Navy parkas." This was a World War II
10th Mountain Division reversible parka shell, white on the inside,
that served only as a wind breaker and camouflage, relying on field
jacket with pile lining and other clothing to be worn beneath. As an
outer garment designed for ski troops practicing stem christies on
the slopes at Vail, Colorado, it was extremely impractical in the
cold at Chosin while being the only outer garment many soldiers had
to wear. One may wonder why bundles of white bed
sheets readily available in Japan were not air dropped to provide
for improvised camouflage. Even before Chosin, research in cold
weather operations was taking place by the Army in Alaska, resulting
in far better clothing and equipment, as well as updated concepts of
operations in cold and snow, the results of which would be seen in
Korea the following winter. [INSERT Lessons
Learned] LESSONS LEARNED
"I find it amazing that highly trained professionals with
extensive combat experience could have approved and tried to execute
the tactical plan of operations for the X Corps in northeast Korea
in November 1950. It appears like a pure Map Exercise put on by
amateurs, appealing in theory, but utterly ignoring the reality of a
huge mountainous terrain, largely devoid of terrestrial
communications, and ordered for execution in the face of a fast
approaching sub‐arctic winter." General Matthew
Ridgeway, review comments on MS for Ebb and Flow, 27 Feb
85.
The Gap Map.jpg
Click within the map area above to see a larger image.
THE GAP Much has been
made of the 80mile gap between the X Corps and the Eighth Army
as it continues to be discussed among Chosin veterans and
historians to this day. Why is "the gap" a problem?
Was the much larger gap between the Inchon landing and the Pusan
perimeter argued in the same light? No. Two major forces, Eighth
Army and Tenth Corps, were pursuing a beaten enemy. The argument
about the gap comes from hindsight that followed the
introduction of a new threat in the theater of operations. The
argument also involves the tendency to search for a scapegoat,
someone to blame when the participants are partly to blame for
the circumstances that were faced. Once again, one must study a
topographic map of that 80mile gap, then answer the question not
often asked: who in his right mind would use such terrain, and
if so, for what purpose? And finally, in the end, why
didn't the Chinese make use of it? There lies the
answer. SECURITY AND THE FUNCHILIN
PASS (p.36) Security was the operative word
at Chosin but being overcautious could tip the advantage to the
enemy. Ground reconnaissance was the key to security and often
neglected during the Chosin operation. Reports were made that
company and platoon size patrols were used to seek out the enemy
(see Patrols on p.45), when in fact it was not a recon patrol,
but a combat patrol. Ground reconnaissance can only be effective
during day or night by using small teams relying on the mobility
of the infantryman. When no confirmed
information is available about enemy units in the area of
operations, a combat patrol will see only that which the enemy
wants them to see. Whereas a recon patrol of
well‐camouflaged men using stealth would have
accomplished as much as the North Korean or Chinese scouts were
doing when they observed the Americans. Once the enemy unit has
been located it is then time to make use of combat patrols to
contact and maintain that contact until the commander commits
forces to attack and destroy. The action at Sudong during early
November is an example of permitting a Chinese division to break
contact without being pursued. The 5th
Marines east of Chosin sent patrols to the north and northeast,
both too large for reconnaissance purposes. Major Chinese forces
were just beyond the next mountain and within artillery range of
Marine positions. These Chinese units were on the move late in
the day when the last of the 5th Marine battalions withdrew,
attacking the arriving Army units within hours.
Security at Chosin was a guessing game. Reports based
on very few captured soldiers who identified their division were
an indicator that elements of the division were in the area.
Little is known about the specific locations and activities of
Chinese divisions and their various regiments other than results
of interrogations of a few enemy soldiers.
After‐the‐fact enemy documents and publications
remain incomplete. Details on attack plans and locations of
battalions and companies are needed to tell the complete
story. Security also relates to the
disposition of friendly forces, especially securing bases of
operations such as Hagaruri which was a key road junction
serving units to the north and west. East Hill, actually a
mountain, was far too large to be secured by the units available
at the time. This was not the case at Kotori more than four
miles from the crest of the most critical terrain feature, the
Funchilin Pass. Most neglected was the gatehouse bridge in the
pass that apparently received some recognition but no action to
secure the site. Was this too far to the rear to be of
concern? NEW ORDERS
(p.40) One of the most difficult problems in
understanding Chosin is the timing of plans and orders, as well
as the viewpoints of the commanders involved. The 1MarDiv had
the mission of attacking north and was urged by the corps
commander to make haste, to get going and make contact with the
enemy. This did not happen in the way envisioned by General
Almond. On the other hand, General Smith was
concerned with the dispersion of this regiments, wanting to
gather them as close as possible considering the terrain and
build up his bases along the Chosin MSR. Today most historians
or writers look at Smith's delay as beneficial. This may be
so, although this theory comes from hindsight and does not
represent the need at the time for movement to accomplish the
mission. A war game would reveal that, within the time frame of
the movement north, two of the Marine regiments could have been
disposed from Hagaruri to the town of Changjin north of the
reservoir dam, a gap through which the Chinese moved forces
south to the reservoir. While hastening the
movement north, the division's Reconnaissance Company and
later the 41 Commando, Royal Marines, both highly trained in
reconnaissance, could have been used to find the enemy. Had this
happened the disposition of the Marine regiments would not have
favored the plan to attack west from Yudam‐ni, but would
have envisioned the attack west from the town of Changjin, a far
greater threat to the Chinese. Bear in mind that the primary
route south by the Chinese was down the Changjin river system,
and not through the mountains west of Yudamni. The Changjin
route followed a valley with a reasonably good road, a narrow
gauge railroad and many manmade structures which offered shelter
to advancing forces. The Chinese used it. The Americans
didn't. The Marine regiments were
eventually disposed near the south end of the Changjin reservoir
system when MacArthur came up with his plan and order to attack
through the rugged mountain range west of Yudamni at a time when
intelligence documents reported the beginning of severe winter
weather, also a time when friendly forces were unprepared in
both training and equipment to be combat effective in winter
warfare. A similar command situation had already developed in
China as they too committed unprepared armies through the same
terrain to meet the Americans. The Chinese soldier's
weapons, limited equipment and logistic system were far less
combat effective than his enemy.
TIMING The schedule was not based on the need
to prepare and move the major units in time to execute a plan,
but rather that of wishful thinking. There is a tendency to say
the staff didn't properly brief General MacArthur on the
terrain and weather involved in such an operation; no, such
thoughts were unnecessary because most knew that MacArthur had
already made up his mind and nothing could have changed
it. Once again we face various
interpretations of the change in X Corps plans when, in fact,
the plans originated with MacArthur. The original plan was for
the 1MarDiv to attack north on the east side of the reservoir
toward the Yalu river, a logical move because to the west were
the mountain ranges of "the gap," with limited
westward access. At that time the boundary between X Corps and
Eighth Army was on the west side of the reservoir with no need
for Marine units to be sent to Yudamni. The
"ridiculous plan" (Ridgeway's hindsight) to send
the 1MarDiv west did not consider of the terrain nor the time of
year. This plan called for the movement of RCT 31 to the east
side of the reservoir to relieve the 5th Marines so they could
move west with the division. The 7th Infantry Division then
taking over the sector east of the reservoir – north to
the Yalu. As it was, the plan called for urgent relief of the
5th Marines east of the reservoir, executed with such haste that
all units of RCT 31 did not reach the Chosin area before the
Chinese attacked and closed the MSR. On the
afternoon of 26 November the 2/5 Marines moved to Yudamni to
prepare for the attack the following morning, the date ordered
by X Corps, leaving Faith's 1/32 as the third infantry
battalion for the 5th Marines should they have been needed. On
the morning of 27 November the 2/5 Marines initiated the attack
west of Yudamni as the remainder of the 5th Marines began
withdrawing from positions east of the reservoir. The 2/5
Marines were stopped cold by the dug in and
well‐camouflaged Chinese, who by their presence announced
they were there in strength. Of interest and not mentioned in
the pamphlet was the original Chinese plan for attacks in the
Chosin area. They had been scheduled to attack on 25 November,
the same day the Chinese launched their attack against Eighth
Army. Since forces were not ready, the attack was postponed and
executed the night of 27 November. Those who believe the Chinese
planned to attack two marine regiments at Yudamni must work this
fact into "what if?" analysis, realizing had they
attacked as originally planned, they would have attacked one
marine regiment on each side of the reservoir. The Army RCT
planned for Chosin would still have been east of the Fusen
Reservoir. With the 5th Marines departing and RCT 31 arriving on
27 November, the Chinese commander had no time to make changes
in his plans. He attacked that night.
EAST OF CHOSIN (p.45‐46) The
pamphlet's introduction to RCT 31 begins with the arrival
of Faith's 1/32 Infantry on 25 November. We note that
"a patrol of Taplett's battalion had almost reached
the northern end of the reservoir before brushing up against a
small party of Chinese," with no explanation. What type of
patrol was this, how far was the northern end of the reservoir
from the 3/5 positions; in other words, what does "brush
up" mean? Of significance is the next
paragraph that states "With the relief of RCT 5 by
Faith's battalion, Marine operations east of the reservoir
would end." Did they actually believe the presence of 1/32
relieved them of the responsibility for the zone of operation
east of Chosin? Of course not, so why say it?
Although "Faith's command relationship to the 1st
Marine Division is not clear," we believe there was no
question at the time. Faith was in the tactical zone of RCT 5
with no way of getting operational or logistical support other
than from the Marines. And, had the Chinese attacked (as
planned), Faith's 1/32 would have fought with RCT
5. We then come to the statement that Murray
"did caution Faith not to move farther north without orders
from the 7th Division," a statement often misused by
historians. This adds confusion to the next statement that
"once Murray departed, the only radio link between Faith
and the 1st MarDiv would be ... [Stamford's radio]"
when, in fact, the RCT commander and his units were about to
arrive as stated by BGen Hodes during his visit to Faith on 26
November. The caution not to move further north has been
confusing, some believing the intention was not to move into the
forward Marine battalion position. Some believe that Faith
occupied the northern 3/5 positions on his own. The use of
hearsay in describing a situation continues to confuse and
create a smoke screen, just as inferring that RCT 31 paid no
attention to the enemy threat when they saw the threat just as
Murray saw it, for he was their only source of information at
that time. Missing is an exchange between Murray and MacLean on
26‐27 November. RCT 31 EAST
OF THE RESERVOIR (p.48) "Faith, ignoring
Murray's caution, received MacLean's permission to
move his battalion forward the next morning to the position
vacated by Taplett's [3/5] battalion." Without an
explanation, the words "ignoring Murray's
caution" is once again difficult to understand since
Maclean [RCT 31] was ordering [OpO 25] 1/32 to occupy the
northern battalion position of RCT 5. The road east of the
reservoir was narrow and Faith's movement north would have
to wait for the southbound movement of RCT 5 (minus one
battalion) which would take most of the morning.
p.5253 Under a subheading "Chinese Order of
Battle" the reader learns that "Sung would make the
destruction of the 1st Marine Division ... his main
effort." Then we read that the "27th Army ... was
charged with attacking the two Marine Regiments at
Yudamni." This is not correct. However, it does serve to
reinforce Chosin hype that Yudamni was the primary objective of
the CCF. This does not address the enemy plan to drive south
through the Marines east of Chosin and cut off the Marines at
Yudamni. The author has elected to follow the Chosin
"story" of the past rather than explain the Chinese
commander's plan and the execution of that plan which has
been known to historians long before the publication of this
pamphlet. The I&R Platoon didn't
"roar out of the compound" because "several
hundred Chinese had been sighted." The platoon by OpO 25
was given the mission of establishing a screen east of the
Inlet, a direction of major concern to MacLean since the RCT
left the Fusen area. Once again we read that
the RCT units were "stretched out on the road for 10 miles
in seven different positions." If a map with unit
dispositons had been provided the reader would have learned that
the combat battalions were disposed within supporting distance
of each other. The two forward battalions, 1/32 and 3/31,
occupied the two forward battalion positions occupied by RCT 5
just a few hours before. Ray Embree's battalion CP occupied
the location of Murray's RCT 5 CP. Faith
did not received orders "to attack the next morning."
He received OpO 25 in writing delivered personally by RCT 31
liaison officer Lt. Rolin Skilton, an order that stated the RCT
would attack "on order," which means be prepared to
attack when ordered to attack. The attack
"east of the reservoir" was made by the 80th CCF
Division reinforced by a regiment of the 81st CCF Division. On
the second day the CCF commander committed the remainder of 81st
Division and held the 94th Division in reserve for his main
effort down the east side of the reservoir.
ALMOND VISITS FAITH p.58‐59
"[MacLean] knew little about what had happened south of the
inlet." This is not accurate, see Breakout by Hugh Robbins,
CJ02.28.04. "Col. MacLean came back from the 1/32 CP about
dawn and reported things were pretty much under control and all
units of the battalion were holding. The 57FA reported that A
Battery was being overrun... . Their CP was under considerable
fire and partially surrounded.... the 3/31 reported its command
post was under heavy fire and close range attack. In quick
succession reports came in that Reilly and Embree had both
become casualties, though not killed." As we can see, Col.
MacLean knew far more about the Inlet battle than had been
reported in the past. "Stopping to see
MacLean, Almond advised him that the previously planned attack
would be resumed once the 2/31 joined the regiment. This
battalion and Battery C of the 57FA were marooned far south on
the clogged MSR." Battery C/57FA had
been detached from RCT 31 and remained in the Puckchong area,
while A/31FA (155mm) had been attached to 57FA and never did
make it to the Chosin area. See RCT 31 OpO 25.
Noted are the photographs of the Inlet area that are
credited to (courtesy of) Norman Strickbine. These same photos
can also be found in Appleman's two books credited to
either Embree or Miller. The original source is a set of 18
photos by Ivan Long of Hq/31 who had been with MacLean's
forward CP. It is believed that many copies of this set were
made and found their way into the hands of wounded personnel in
Japan. Sgt. Strickbine was a photographer with Hq 13th Engineer
Battalion. MACLEAN'S
DISAPPEARANCE P.65 "His comrades buried
him [MacLean] by the side of the road." A search for more
detail on this subject takes one eventually to a footnote in
Appleman's East of Chosin, p.147, which then takes one to
p.365 where we find n.35 "I recall reading a newspaper
interview with the soldier that told of Col. MacLean's
death and burial. The soldier interviewed was probably one of
the thousands turned over to American Authorities during the
armistice prisoner exchange in 1953. I made a clipping of the
article and put it with other Korean War notes. Now, more than
30 years later, I cannot find the clipping and provide the
citation. But I am so certain of the facts recounted that I have
no hesitation in including them in this narrative." This
should excite historians to ask more questions. Who was the
source, where did the burial take place, who gave them the tools
to dig a grave in the frozen ground, and finally, was there ever
a follow‐up with a second source to verify the story?
Those who have interviewed American prisoners who made those
long night marches to the first prison camp at Kanggye find it
difficult to accept the story. END
NOTES Due to the length of the pamphlet being
discussed, we will continue our review in the next issue of the
Changjin Journal. END CJ
10.10.04
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